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1. INTRODUCTION 5
1. INTRODUCTION
The performance of the Russian economy stands in striking contrast to
the performance of several other countries in Eastern Europe and Asia
that have also undertaken economic reforms. Real Russian GDP had
been declining for eight years and has stabilized in 19971 for a short
period of time, whereas Poland and China, for example, have benefited
from continued high growth. This paper argues that inefficient inter-
governmental relations are a possibly important reason why Russia lags
behind other countries in economic growth. In particular, this paper pro-
vides evidence that the structure of revenue sharing between regional
and local governments affects governments’ incentives to foster busi-
ness growth and to provide public goods efficiently.
I use a unique data set on Russian city budgets to show that any
change in a local government’s own revenues is almost entirely offset
by an opposite change in shared revenues. Local governments are un-
able to benefit from an increase in the local tax base, and therefore lack
a revenue incentive to expand the tax base.
What are the consequences of the magnitude of fiscal incentives? I build
a simple model to illustrate that if fiscal incentives are strong, i.e., if an
increase in the local tax base results in a nearly equal increase in budg-
etary revenues, then governments bear financial costs in terms of for-
gone taxes when they over-regulate or restrict business. In contrast, if
fiscal incentives are weak so that the local government's ability to in-
crease its marginal revenue by increasing its tax base is close to zero,
then budget revenues are not affected by changes in governmental
policy towards business. Economically unjustified political intervention
into business, such as excessive regulation, adversely influences entre-
preneurial activity and lowers the governmental tax base.2 In a system
with stronger local fiscal incentives, one should observe more benign
regulation, and higher growth compared to a system with weaker fiscal
incentives. In addition, stronger fiscal incentives should lead to higher
efficiency in provision of public goods, because a smaller portion of
public expenditures is wasted.
Having shown that fiscal incentives are weak in Russia on average, I
empirically examine their consequences. First, I provide some evidence
that the strength of fiscal incentives affects private business formation.
Second, I show that the efficiency of public spending at the local level
increases with local fiscal incentives. For each city and year I gauge
strength of fiscal incentives by a binomial indicator of the presence (or
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absence) of crowding-out of changes in own revenues by changes in
shared revenues. I then estimate how the variation in the strength of fis-
cal incentives helps to predict variation in outcomes of public goods
provision and formation of private businesses.
My approach rests on the theory of "market-preserving federalism."3
This literature stresses the importance of the government officials’ fiscal
and political incentives for economic growth. Contributors to this litera-
ture (e.g. Oi, 1992; Oi, 1994; Montinola et al., 1995; Qian and Weingast,
1996; Qian and Weingast, 1997; and Jin et al., 1999) argue that the
Chinese fiscal reform of the early 1980s until 1994 gave local govern-
ments incentives to pursue local economic growth and possibly created
a basis for China’s remarkable economic performance.4 "The impor-
tance of these new fiscal arrangements (in China) is that they induce a
strong positive relationship between local revenue and local economic
prosperity for all provinces and cities, thus providing local officials with
incentive to foster that prosperity."5 Other work on Chinese fiscal rela-
tions, however, has shown that such a strong relationship between eco-
nomic performance of a locality and local budget revenue existed only in
certain parts of China and not in others.6 The main result of this paper
contrasts with the literature on Chinese federalism because it shows that
the system of intergovernmental relations in Russia represents a model
that deserves to be called "market-hampering federalism" since local
revenues are independent of local economic prosperity.7
Shleifer (1997) argues that the economic difficulties of Russia’s last
decade are explained in part by the government’s failure to provide in-
stitutions that promote business growth. He also provides some evi-
dence of the predatory nature of local governments in Russia and dis-
cusses several theories of what determines government performance. In
accord with Shleifer (1997), this paper lends support to the view that
Russia’s poor economic performance is explained to some extent by the
lack of incentives for local governments to encourage business forma-
tion. Following the EBRD’s 1997 Transition Report and Johnson et al.
(1997), the evidence provided here suggests that the building of mar-
ket-supporting institutions is an important requirement for a successful
transition.
There has been extensive previous research on federal-regional fiscal
relations in Russia. Treisman (1996a, 1996b, and 1997) has shown that
federal grants are distributed purely according to political negotiation
and do not follow economic objectives of federal center. Lavrov (1996)
has demonstrated that there is a vertical imbalance between the distri-
bution of revenues and expenditure responsibilities: during recent years,
regional governments have controlled a disproportionately high share of
2. CHINESE VERSUS RUSSIAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS 7
resources. There has been, however, a void in our understanding of re-
gional-local relations. This paper describes the effects of de facto re-
gional control over local finance.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a comparison of
some organizational details of the Chinese and Russian governments.
Section 3 develops a simple model of fiscal incentives. Section 4 de-
scribes the data and the empirical methodology. Section 5 contains
the empirical results. Section 6 presents a robustness check, while Sec-
tion 7 concludes.
2. CHINESE VERSUS RUSSIAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS
In this section, I compare organizational structures of governments in
China and Russia and argue that they have many similarities, but may
differ substantially in revenue sharing schemes and the incentives cre-
ated by these schemes.8
Russia is a federal state. China is a decentralized authoritarian state that
in terms of fiscal affairs functions like a federal state.9 There are for-
mally five levels of government in China.10 As a result of a fiscal reform
in the early 1980s (until 1994 — the time of another major fiscal reform)
the Chinese system of intergovernmental relations has achieved
"greater decentralization of fiscal authority, especially in terms of in-
creasing autonomy of local governments over taxation".11
In Russia, there are also five levels of government.12 The top three levels
formally are authorized to collect their own revenues and make deci-
sions on expenditures.13 The first tier local governments became offi-
cially independent from the upper levels in 1991 and since 1993, the in-
dependence of the first tier local governments has been guaranteed by
the Constitution.14
2.1. Local expenditure responsibilities
The distribution of expenditure responsibilities among levels of govern-
ment is similar in China and Russia. In Russia, a third of total public
spending takes place on the local level.15 In China, the sub-provincial
share of total public spending was growing in 1980s and reached 47 per
cent in 1993.16 Both in China and Russia expenditure responsibilities
between different levels of government are poorly defined.17 De facto
local governments in both countries are responsible for providing some
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basic public goods, including pre-college education and most health
care.18 They also provide garbage collection, local public transportation,
some police protection, local road maintenance, etc. Finally, local gov-
ernments subsidize loss-making enterprises. In Russia, the largest share
of expenditures at the local level is subsidies to large industrial enter-
prises and utilities; in China, subsidies constitute much smaller (al-
though significant) portion of local budgets.
Regulatory authority over private business in both countries is concen-
trated at the local level. Local governments are responsible for licensing
and registration of firms.19 Local authorities also rent out space to busi-
nesses and establish most of regulations and fines.20 For example,
health, fire, and other inspectors are subordinate to local government’s
offices and are financed out of local budgets.
2.2. Local revenue sources
Sources and structure of revenue for local governments are similar in
the two countries as well. Local revenues consist of own and shared
revenues in Russia and within-budget and off-budget revenues in China;
the latter in turn are composed of extra-budgetary (EBF) and self-raised
(SRF) funds.21 The local off-budget revenues in China and the local own
revenues in Russia consist of: (1) various ad hoc local taxes, including
license and other fees, and various surcharges and fines; and (2) non-
tax revenues, which mostly come from municipal property leases, profits
from municipal enterprises and TVEs, and privatization.22 The compo-
nents of shared and within-budget revenues are (1) taxes shared with
upper levels of government, and (2) transfers (grants) from upper levels
of government.23 "Uses of EBF and SRF are virtually identical to those of
budgetary revenues."24 The same is true for uses of own and shared
revenues in Russia.
The Chinese and Russian fiscal governmental structures look quite
similar. In particular, the local governments in both countries have a
certain level of autonomy in their decisions on taxation and expendi-
tures. In addition, the sources of revenues and expenditure responsibili-
ties of local governments in the two countries are analogous.25 There is
one possibly important difference between the Chinese and Russian in-
tergovernmental relations, however: the revenue sharing between differ-
ent levels of government.
2.3. Revenue sharing
In China, there is a large diversity of revenue sharing arrangements.26 A
common feature to revenue sharing in all of China is that a substantial
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part of revenues (off-budget revenues) are not subject to sharing.27 A
widespread sharing arrangement for revenues within-budget is the fol-
lowing: A lower level of government enters into a long-term contract
with the upper level of government on a total amount or a share of
revenues to be remitted to the upper level for several years and the
lower level of government keeps the remainder of the collections.28
There is an extensive evidence on the magnitude of the marginal remit-
tance rates for provincial within-budget revenues by the central govern-
ment. Jin et al. (1999) report the mean marginal remittance rate of 16%
of provincial revenue collection calculated using data on 29 provinces
over the period of 1982–1992. In 1980, 10 out of 29 provinces had zero
marginal remittance rates; by 1988, 26 out of 29 provinces had zero
marginal remittance rates.29
Data on revenue sharing arrangements below the province-level is less
systematic. The literature presents considerable anecdotal evidence.
Wong (1997) reports that below the province-level of Chinese govern-
ment there are some exceptions to the long-term revenue sharing rules.
These exceptions are especially frequent at the township-level: "Sharing
total revenues is the form (of sharing arrangements) most often applied
to prosperous townships, and the sharing rate is set annually."30 At the
township level, however, there is an explicit official recognition of im-
portance of non-budgetary sources (SRF and EBF) for financing gov-
ernment and creating revenue incentives.31
The decentralized nature of off-budget revenues of sub-national gov-
ernments in China ensures local government security from predatory
taxation by the upper-level of government.32 Therefore, in most Chinese
localities marginal remittance rates of the total revenues by the upper
levels of government are quite low. This fact has motivated several
authors to argue that between 1980s and early 1990s China has be-
come an instance of "market-preserving federalism" since many local
governments have become residual claimants of local tax base and,
therefore, have gained strong incentives to maximize local revenues.33
In contrast, the regional-local and federal-regional revenue sharing ar-
rangements in Russia are frequently renegotiated. Thus, the revenues of
the Russian government at sub-national levels depend on the distribu-
tion of bargaining power. As a result of this bargaining, budget funds of
local governments are independent of their efforts to raise additional
own revenues. Treisman has shown that negotiation over the federal-
regional sharing schemes gives regional governments incentives to en-
courage separatist movements and other forms of political revolt against
the federal government.34 I focus instead on the effects of fiscal nego-
tiation between local and regional governments. The components of
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shared revenues at the local level are determined through annual
(or bi-annual) negotiations between local and regional officials.35 In most
regions, the portions of shared taxes and the amounts of transfers are
not determined on the basis of a fixed formula, and vary both over time
and across localities within a single region.
Regional authorities set target levels of expenditures for localities de-
pending on past experience. These targets serve as a foundation for the
amounts of shared revenues to be allocated to each locality. Regional
officials estimate the "needed level of expenditures" for each local gov-
ernment in the region, and the total amount of funds that is to be dis-
tributed among the localities in the form of shared taxes and transfers.
Regions then negotiate the actual amounts of transfers and shared
revenues with localities. As I will show in the empirical section, this sys-
tem gives local governments of large cities no incentive to maximize
city’s own revenue because additional local revenues are almost entirely
taxed away by the regional authorities.
Therefore, comparison of revenue sharing systems in Chinese and Rus-
sian localities may suggest that these systems represent two alternative
models of fiscal federalism since local revenues in China depend on the
size of the local tax base to a much greater degree than it is the case in
Russia.36
3. EFFECTS OF FISCAL INCENTIVES, A SIMPLE MODEL
In this section, I consider a very simple model that illustrates how the
strength of governmental fiscal incentives can influence local support for
business growth and the efficiency of public goods provision.
Consider a mayor of a city, who solves the following maximization prob-
lem:
SBcP
SBP
++
,,
max   subject to  OWNSHAREDSP +≤+ . (1)
The mayor chooses the level of public goods provision P, the level of
regulation of private business B, and the amount of budget revenues S
to be diverted for his private use.37 The mayor receives a political bene-
fit from the provision of public goods, given by cP . He receives a pri-
vate benefit from excessive business regulation, given by B, as more
regulation implies the opportunity to receive more bribes because bribes
are offered in exchange for relief from regulations. He also receives pri-
vate benefit from diverted budgetary revenues, given by S. Parameter c
is exogenous. I assume that 10 << c , i.e. the mayor has higher valua-
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tion of private benefits from stealing and bribes compared to political
benefits from spending on public goods.38 The level of over-regulation
may influence the popularity of the mayor. My assumption is that the
private benefit of excessive regulation exceeds its political cost and,
therefore, B can be treated as a net benefit of over-regulation to the
mayor.39
The mayor faces the constraint that the sum of public spending and the
amount of diverted funds SP +  does not exceed the budget revenues
at the mayor’s disposal. The budget revenues consist of the sum of
shared and own revenues.
Own revenue is an increasing function of the city’s tax base which, in
turn, depends positively on P and negatively on B. Public goods pro-
vided by the mayor reduce the costs of business in the city and, there-
fore, increase entrepreneurial activity. An example of such a public good
is law and order. Inefficient over-regulation decreases the profitability
of business and, therefore, decreases entrepreneurial activity.40 By
assumption, own revenues consist of a fixed part W  and a variable
part ( )BPW , :
( )BPWWOWN ,+= . (2)
For simplicity, we assume the following form for ( )BPW , :
( ) ( ) ( )ByPgBPW =, ,  where  0  and  0 <′>′ yg . (3)
We assume that shared revenues depend on the amount of own city
revenues: they consist of a fixed part T  and a variable part ( )WT  that
equals Wα :
( )WTTSHARED += , (4)
( ) WWT α= . (5)
The exogenous parameter 01 ≤α≤−  represents the weakness of fiscal
incentives, i.e., the mayor’s ability (or inability) to raise revenues at the
margin. If 1−=α , then fiscal incentives are at their weakest since
budget revenues are independent of the mayor’s actions, P, B, and S,
because changes in own revenues are fully crowded out by changes in
shared revenues. If 0=α , then a change in the city own tax collections
results in an equivalent change in local budget revenues, so fiscal in-
centives are strong. From the available accounts it appears that ( )α+1
is most likely significantly greater than zero in China. Empirical investi-
gation in this paper shows that in Russia ( )α+1  is close to zero.
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The mayor’s optimization problem, therefore, can be rewritten as fol-
lows:
SBPc
SBP
++
,,
max   subject to  ( ) ( ) ( )ByPgWTSP α+++≤+ 1 (6)
Denote the solution to the mayor’s maximization problem to be *S , *P ,
and *B .41 The following propositions help to illustrate how fiscal incen-
tives affect the decisions of the mayor.42
Proposition 1. 0
*
<
αd
dB
, for all α .
Proposition 2. 0
*
>
αd
dP
, for all α .
Proposition 3. 
[ ] [ ]
0
)1(
<
α
∗∗α+−=+
∗
ygdWTd
d
dS
.
Propositions 1 and 2 state that as strength of fiscal incentives rises,
level of inefficient regulation decreases and level of public goods provi-
sion increases. Fiscal incentives, then, can stimulate entrepreneurial ac-
tivity and positively influence economic performance. Proposition 3
states that if we compare two cities with equal budget revenues but with
different fiscal incentives, the mayor of the city where fiscal incentives
are stronger steals less from the city budget. This means that the effi-
ciency of public goods provision is higher in the city with stronger fiscal
incentives.43 An important implication of propositions 1 and 2 is that city
tax base increases with fiscal incentives.
The model does not consider official tax rates explicitly because the ef-
fect of fiscal incentives on tax rates can not be tested in the empirical
section since there is no data on local tax rates.44
This highly stylized model illustrates that the strength of fiscal incentives
affects the attitude of politicians towards private businesses and the ef-
ficiency of public goods provision.
4. DATA AND THE EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
In this section, I describe the data and specify a number of hypotheses
motivated in the previous sections and an empirical strategy to test
these hypotheses.
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4.1. Structure and sources of the data
I use a unique panel data set of cities over a period of 6 years. It con-
tains detailed budgetary data on expenditures, revenue sources and tax
shares for shared taxes. This data set includes 35 large cities in 29 re-
gions of Russia for the time period 1992–1997. The data set consists of
29 regional capitals and 6 other regional centers. The panel is unbal-
anced, but I have at least 2 years worth of data for each city. Most of
the variables come from a questionnaire addressed to the heads of fi-
nancial and economic departments of city governments. The survey was
conducted with substantial help from the League of Russian Cities (LRC)
in the summer of 1997. The questionnaire was distributed among 80 lo-
cal administrations of city-members of the LRC. Responses were re-
ceived from 49 cities from 34 regions; only 35 cities, however, pre-
sented at least two years worth of data.
To supplement the LRC survey, data on outcome measures of public
goods provision and the number of businesses in the region were pro-
vided by Goskomstat.45
4.2. Sample
The sample used in this paper consists of large, well-developed cities.
Each is either the only one or one of a very few "donor-localities" for
their regions. In every Russian region, there are usually from one to
three city-donors. These are the cities that have more developed
economies and, therefore, a larger tax base. These cities are "net do-
nors" of tax revenues to the consolidated regional budgets. The rest of
the localities are "net recipients" (primarily rural districts that collect
very few tax revenues). The tax collections from one donor city can be
as much as 70% of the consolidated revenues of the region. For exam-
ple, Barnaul, the capital of Altaysky kray and one of its 72 local jurisdic-
tions, contributes 60% of the consolidated regional tax collections and
accounts for less than a third of consolidated regional expenditures. The
results of this paper, therefore, are limited only to the relations between
regional governments and governments of large cities, and care must
be taken in applying the results to smaller cities.46 The large cities are
where much of official economic activity occurs in Russia; they contrib-
ute the most to the growth of the country.47
4.3. Basic facts about the data
Table 1 presents the composition of expenditures and revenues for an
average annual local budget in my sample for 1992–1997. The average
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Table 1. Composition of expenditures and revenues of an average city budget,
outcomes of public goods provision, changes in shared and own revenues.
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
# of cities with information on current
expenditures and revenues
24 25 29 31 35 41
Average population of the cities (people,
thousand)
619 610 576 571 536 510
Expenditures (TOTAL, 1997 R billion): 533 662 724 782 937 953
  1) Subsidies to utilities, housing
      and enterprises, %
28.4 30.5 35.6 36.1 34.6 34.5
2) Education, % 19.4 19.4 21.7 22.2 22.9 22.9
3) Health care, % 19.3 18.6 19.9 17.2 16.0 16.2
4) Social security, % 4.8 2.4 4.2 6.2 8.0 8.6
5) Administration, % 1.6 1.9 2.4 2.3 2.5 2.7
6) Culture and sports, % 0.6 0.7 1.2 1.5 1.2 1.1
7) Other, % 25.9 26.5 15.0 14.5 14.8 14.0
Revenues (TOTAL, 1997 R billion): 569 684 788 837 941 953
i. Shared Revenues, % 94.8 89.5 85.6 81.8 83.2 80.1
1) Federal and regional taxes, % 86.9 79.5 77.3 73.4 65.6 61.4
2) Transfers from the regions, % 7.9 10.0 8.3 8.4 17.6 18.7
ii. Own Revenues, % 5.2 10.5 14.4 18.2 16.5 19.9
1) Local taxes, % 0.6 6.9 11.6 14.7 14.0 17.2
2) Non-tax revenues, % 4.6 3.6 2.8 3.5 2.5 2.7
# of cities with non-missing data on ∆t
in shared and own revenues
24 25 29 31 31
# of cities with the same sign of ∆t
in own and shared revenues
18 16 15 18 12
# of cities with opposite signs of ∆t
in own and shared revenues
6 9 14 13 19
Change in own revenues
(average ∆t, 1997 R billion)
84.7 76.8 –
10.8
12.9 39.5
Change in shared revenues
(average ∆t, 1997 R billion)
44.5 33.3 38.2 21.7 56.5
Infant mortality (# died per thousand
born)
17.9 19.5 18.1 18.4 18.0 18.5
Children attending schools in the
evening (% to total)
32.6 33.9 31.2 30.1 28.7 30.7
New business formation (# of firms,
thousand)
5.3 5.9 –1.2 –1.6 –1.1
Notes: Nominal variables in 1997 constant prices. Average dollar exchange rate
for 1997 is 5,600 rubles per dollar. 1997 data planned not actual. Federal taxes
include profit tax, VAT, personal income tax, and excise tax; regional taxes in-
clude property taxes, natural resources payments, trade taxes, and other regional
taxes; non-tax revenues include privatization proceeds, revenues from municipal
property leases, and other non-tax revenues.
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annual per capita budget of a large Russian city in 1997 was about
$320.48 The largest expenditures have been subsidies to utilities, hous-
ing and industrial enterprises, expenditures on education, health care,
and social security; in 1997 they constituted 35%, 23%, 16%, and 9% of
local expenditures, respectively. Total budget revenues have nearly
doubled in real terms over the period, since various expenditure respon-
sibilities have been delegated from the upper levels of government to
the localities. The composition of revenues has been changing over
time: own revenues have grown from 5% to 20% of total revenues. Own
revenues, however, had a potential to grow much faster because of in-
creases in the value of property and the growth of markets in these cit-
ies. The share of local own revenues in total local revenues is still much
smaller in Russia than in most other countries.49
Table 1 also exhibits: distributions of signs of changes in shared and
own revenues over time and yearly averages of the measures of public
goods provision.50 A more complete set of descriptive statistics for all
variables is presented in Appendix B.
4.4. Empirical methodology
Hypothesis I: In Russia, local fiscal incentives are very weak on average
(α from the model above is close to minus one). Regional administra-
tions cut transfers to local governments and lower the local portion of
shared taxes when the city collects more on its own.
The alternative hypothesis is that local governments have strong fiscal
incentives. At the extreme, the alternative implies that shared revenues
are determined independently of shifts in own revenues. The alternative
hypothesis is closer to the description of Chinese federalism given in the
"market-preserving federalism" literature. Jin et al. report that at the
province-level in 1982–1992 in China, α is about –0.16 on average. To
test this hypothesis, I estimate the following equation:
it
tiititit
ε+γ++η+∆α=∆ 










dummy
year
effect
city
lation
-popu
revenues
own
revenues
shared ' , (7)
H0: α = –1; Ha: α is close to 0.
In equation (7), both shared and own revenues are measured in con-
stant rubles; ∆ denotes annual changes; i is the city subscript; t is the
year subscript; and εit is an error term. Given that there is no intercept
in the regression and the sum of city effects is constrained to zero, the
parameter α represents the crowding out of own revenues by shared
INCENTIVES TO PROVIDE LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS16
revenues from the equation (5) in the model. For a one-ruble increase in
own revenues, shared revenues, on average, decrease by α rubles. The
closer is α to minus one, the weaker the fiscal incentives. The closer it is
to zero, the stronger the fiscal incentives.
For the shared and own revenues, I use the following definitions. Shared
revenues are equal to the sum of the actual local budgetary revenues
from federal and regional shared taxes, and the actual transfer from the
budget of the region.51 Own revenues are equal to the sum of local
taxes and local non-tax revenues. Panel data allow me to make use of
variation both across cities and over time.52 For estimation of equation
(7) and for all other estimation procedures in this paper (unless stated
otherwise), specifications with fixed and random city-specific effects are
used. City-specific effects in the regressions control for unobservable
city-specific, time-invariant differences across cities that may affect the
dependent variables. There are many such variables, ranging from ge-
ography to special federal projects. I also include year dummies in the
regressions to control for systematic changes in the shared revenues of
all cities in a particular year. Examples of these systematic changes are
the mandatory transfers of expenditures from the federal and regional
level to the local level of government initiated by federal laws, such as
an increase in childcare benefits or veteran pensions. Population is used
in specification (7) to control for the fact that the relation between the
shared and own revenues may depend on the size of the city. I also re-
port the result of simple OLS regression of changes in shared revenues
on changes in own revenues with no constant term and no controls.
Equation (7) is estimated both using the whole sample and on a sub-
sample that excludes planned data for 1997.
Hypothesis II: The speed of private business formation in a city is posi-
tively correlated with the local government’s fiscal incentives.
Hypothesis II is hard to test directly because data on business formation
at the city-level are unavailable. I consequently use region-level data.
The results of the test using the following specification are merely sug-
gestive.
,
dummy 
year
effect
city
capita  per
expend.  total
lation
-popu
proxy
  incentives
  businesses
of  number
'ln it
tiititit
it
ε+γ++χ+λ+θ=
=∆






 









(8)
H0: θ >0; Ha: θ ≤ 0.
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In equation (8), incentives proxy is a variable that measures the strength
of fiscal incentives of the city government in city i in year t. I use a very
simple proxy for fiscal incentives: it is equal to zero if changes in shared
and own revenues have opposite signs; otherwise, the incentives proxy
is equal to one. An incentives proxy equal to zero is an indicator of
weaker fiscal incentives and an incentives proxy equal to one is an indi-
cator of stronger fiscal incentives. Tax bases for shared and local taxes
in a city are highly positively correlated, both being functions of the level
of economic development in this city.53 So, if shared and own revenues
shift in different directions (i.e., the incentives proxy equals zero), then
there is some crowding-out of changes in own revenues by changes in
shared revenues and the local government is not financially independent
from the regional government. One should note that positive incentives
proxy does not necessarily mean that there is no such crowding-out. For
example, during the transition period, regional governments have been
transferring some functions to the local level along with shared revenues
that were supposed to pay for these mandatory changes in expenditure
responsibilities. This process made it harder to identify the extent of fis-
cal crowding-out.54 In short, the measure of the strength of fiscal incen-
tives suggested here is quite noisy.55
The variable ∆(number of businesses) is the number of newly privatized
and newly opened businesses in the region.56 Given the assumption that
most registered economic activity is going on in the large cities, this
variable captures the variation in business formation within the regional
capital cities.
As noted, population is included in the regression to control for city-
size. Naturally, under otherwise similar conditions, fewer businesses can
be formed in the smaller cities. The log of budgetary expenditures per
capita is an important control for the need to increase the local tax
base: the lower the expenditures per capita, the higher the need for ad-
ditional own revenues ceteris paribus assuming that they will not be
taxed away by the regional authorities. It is worth noting that while this
control is endogenous to the number of businesses in a city, it is ex-
ogenous to its first difference since for the sample period newly emerg-
ing businesses were granted tax holidays for the first year of their exis-
tence.57
Hypothesis III: If fiscal incentives are strong, then public goods are pro-
vided more efficiently than when fiscal incentives are weak.
Two approaches to testing this hypothesis are employed. First, for a
given level of expenditures on certain public good, the strength of fiscal
incentives should affect outcome of provision of this public good since a
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smaller portion of funds is wasted or stolen. I estimate the following
equation using the whole sample to test this:
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H0: δ > 0; Ha: δ ≤ 0.
I use two measures of outcomes associated with public goods provision:
the infant mortality rate and the share of school children who must at-
tend school in the evening due to overcrowded schools. These meas-
ures were chosen because they seem likely to depend on the quality of
public goods provision, and they are directly related to government
choices over which data is available. Health literature establishes that
the availability of primary care in the first days of life is, on the one
hand, a direct function of outlays on primary care and, on the other
hand, an important determinant of infant mortality. In addition, the avail-
ability of schools in Russia is also very closely dependent on current lo-
cal government expenditures. There is a paradoxical situation: the num-
ber of schools per child is very high in Russia relative to most developed
countries, but the percentage of students who attend schools in the
evening due to overcrowded schools is also very high. This is because
many existing schools, a legacy of soviet welfare state, are currently
closed. To open these schools, local governments need to make (un-
substantial but necessary) renovations financed by capital outlays from
the local budgets. In estimation of equation (9), I consider health care
and education expenditures as public expenditures corresponding to the
outcomes of public goods provision described above.
Three different specifications were used to estimate equation (9): fixed
effects, random effects, and fixed effects with an instrument for public
expenditures per capita. One might suspect that expenditures per capita
are correlated with some component of the error term ε, in which case
the fixed and random effects specifications yield biased and inconsistent
estimates of the parameters.58 So, I instrument budgetary expenditures
on education and health care of the city with the regional ratio of indus-
trial to agricultural output.59 The choice of specification does not sub-
stantially affect the results, however.
An alternative, perhaps, more convincing way to test hypothesis III would
be to look at the interaction between the incentives proxy and expendi-
tures per capita. Due to the simple nature of the incentives proxy, the
approach to test hypothesis III is to divide the data into two sub-
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samples, based on whether incentives proxy is equal to one or zero.60
Then, I run separate regressions on each sub-sample, regressing out-
come measures on the logarithm of corresponding public expenditures,
and the population, with city-specific random effects. This approach
gets around a possible problem of reverse causality in equation (9): if
the regional governments bail out only the localities where outcomes of
public goods provision are low and do not bail out localities with high
outcomes of public goods provision then one could get a positive effect
of the incentives proxy in equation (9) even if the efficiency of provision
is the same across localities. Estimation of equation (10) directly tests
the impact of expenditures on outcomes.
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Hypothesis III implies that ρ will be greater in magnitude and more sig-
nificant for the sub-sample with better fiscal incentives (the sub-sample
where the incentives proxy equals one).
In Section 6, I present the results of a robustness check against an al-
ternative explanation that is consistent with hypotheses II and III. The
methodology of this check is based on testing the described hypotheses
on a sub-sample that excludes observations with shared and own reve-
nues increasing simultaneously.
4.5. Correlations
Before the presentation of formal regression results, I report some basic
correlations between the variables used for the regression analysis. Ta-
ble 2 presents these correlations.
Annual changes in shared and own revenues are negatively correlated
with a correlation coefficient of –0.44 significant at the 1% level. Incen-
tives proxy is positively correlated with the new business formation vari-
able (insignificant) and outcomes of public goods provision: infant mor-
tality (correlation coefficient is equal to –0.16 significant at 07%) and
unavailability of schools (coefficient equals –0.07 insignificant). Incen-
tives proxy is also slightly negatively correlated with the size of the city
(insignificant). The signs of all these correlations are as implied by hy-
potheses I–III.
Health care expenditures per capita are negatively correlated with infant
mortality, while education expenditures per capita are negatively corre-
lated with unavailability of schools. This provides evidence that these
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outcomes of public goods provision are indeed related to local govern-
ment policies.
5. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM RUSSIAN CITIES
In this section, I present evidence that the fiscal incentives of Russian
local governments are very weak; I show, further, that the absence of
fiscal incentives has deleterious effect on the business formation and
the efficiency of public goods provision.
Table 3 presents the effect of changes in own revenues on changes in
shared revenues in the local budgets. The main finding is that when own
revenues of the city budget rise, they are on average almost entirely
offset by a decrease in the shared revenues in the city budget, just as
Hypothesis I postulates. The coefficient of change in own revenues, α, is
below –0.9 (with a standard error of 0.14) and is stable across specifi-
cations.61 95% confidence interval for the coefficient of change in own
revenues is [–1.20; –0.67]. This is a very large crowding-out rate, sta-
tistically indistinguishable from complete crowding-out. This result is in-
dependent of whether the regression is run on the whole sample or a
sub-sample excluding observations from 1997 based on planned data.
The coefficient α has a direct interpretation: 90 kopecks out of each ad-
Table 2. Pair-wise correlation coefficients.
Change in own revenues Change in shared revenues –0.44a (0.00)
Population Incentives proxy –0.07 (0.44)
Total budgetary revenues Incentives proxy –0.03 (0.65)
Total expenditures
per capita
Incentives proxy –0.02 (0.84)
New business formation Incentives proxy   0.15 (0.12)
Infant mortality Incentives proxy –0.16b (0.06)
Unavailability of schools Incentives proxy –0.07 (0.40)
Infant mortality Health care expenditures
per capita
–0.25a (0.00)
Unavailability of schools Education expenditures
per capita
–0.16a (0.04)
Notes: a, and b — denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. P-values
in parentheses.
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ditional ruble in own revenues is taxed away by the regional government
through decreased tax shares and transfers. A crowding-out rate this
large gives local government no incentives to encourage the growth of
private business in order to boost own tax revenues because local gov-
ernments in Russia simply can not raise revenues at the margin.62
Table 3 provides evidence that budget constraints for local governments
are soft, since regional governments not only tax away marginal own
revenues, but also provide additional revenues if there is a shortfall in
own revenues.
This result could be compared with the argument presented by Oi
(1992), Montinola et al. (1995), Qian and Weingast (1996), and Jin et al.
Table 3. Changes in own revenues are crowded out by changes in shared reve-
nues.
Change in shared revenues
Whole sample Excluding 1997Dependent
variable
(1)
Fixed
effects
(2)
Fixed
effects
(3)
Random
effects, OLS
(4)
OLS
(5)
Random
effects
(6)
OLS
Change in
own revenues
 –0.905a
(–6.28)
 –0.906a
(–6.31)
 –0.940a
(–7.08)
 –0.79a
(–5.66)
 –0.99a
(–5.82)
 –0.80a
(–4.51)
Population  –545.39
(–0.48)
   181.30a
   (4.79)
   173.45a
   (4.16)
# of cities    35    35    35    35    31    31
Sample size    139    139    139    139    109    109
R2 within    0.33    0.32    0.32    0.36
R2 between    0.07    0.05    0.38    0.11
R2 overall    0.10    0.22    0.34    0.19    0.32    0.7
Hausman test:
χ2(k)
   1.91    4.54
Hausman test:
Pr > χ2
   0.93    0.47
Notes: Revenues in constant rubles. (1)–(3) and (5) include year dummies.
T-statistics in parentheses. a — denotes significance at 1% level. In (3), results of
the OLS regression and random effects regression are identical since estimated
variance of random effects is zero. k in Hausman test is equal to 6 in (3)
and 5 in (5).
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(1999); in China, changes in local shared revenues in many localities are
independent of the changes in local own (off-budget) revenues since
within-budget revenues are shared according to predetermined con-
tracts and, therefore, parameter α is closer to zero in these localities. As
has been already noted, however, there are some prosperous townships
where all within-budget revenues are shared and shares are negotiated
annually.63 The opposite to the main conclusion of "market-preserving
federalism" literature is true in Russia: the result in Table 3 shows that
Russian localities do not have a secure, independent source of revenue
that would not be subject to seizure by the regional governments. Local
governments in Russia never became independent fiscal entities. There
is quite a lot of evidence that Russian local governments over-regulate
business, whereas Chinese local governments make efforts to promote
entrepreneurial activity in their communities. Abstracting from other
constitutional and political differences between China and Russia (that,
in my opinion, are likely to make differences in performance of local
governments of two countries smaller rather than larger), one could
suggest that incentives created by different systems of revenue sharing
may potentially, indeed, have impact on local governments policies to
create favorable business environment.
One has to note that extra-budgetary funds exist in Russia as well as in
China. However, one must distinguish Chinese and Russian extra-
budgetary funds. Extra-budgetary funds, while quite large on the re-
gional and federal level in Russia, generally either do not exist or are
very small at the local level. I collected this information from interviews
with mayors in several Russian cities, and it is supported by data on ex-
tra-budgetary funds available for a few cities. Most cities in my sample
do not have extra-budgetary funds at all. This data, however, could
mean only that the mayors are reluctant to give information about these
extra-budgetary funds. But the mayors have argued that there are no
stable sources of revenues for the extra-budgetary funds on the local
level (even when the funds exist) since all stable sources of revenues
are tied to within-budget own-revenues of the local governments. In
short, Russian extra-budgetary funds at the local level are unlikely to
undermine the results of Table 3.
The results also suggest an explanation for the puzzle of why private
businesses in Moscow and St. Petersburg have grown much faster than
businesses in other large Russian cities. Both of Russia’s capitals have
the status of regional governments and may thus have fewer problems
with fiscal incentives.
Table 4 presents evidence in support of the hypothesis II. The strength
of fiscal incentives in cities is positively related (significant at the 10%
level) to the number of newly formed businesses in the region. This is
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only a very weak test, since one has to assume that formation of private
business in the region is highly correlated with formation of private busi-
ness in its capital city. If this assumption is to be believed, the number
of newly opened or privatized businesses in the group with better incen-
tives is 1,710 higher (or 18% of the mean number of registered busi-
nesses in the sample) than in the group with worse fiscal incentives.
As discussed in Section 3, weak fiscal incentives have implications for
how efficiently public money is spent at the local level. Tables 5 and 6
evaluate this proposition. Table 5 presents the results of the estimation
of equation (9). The measures of the outcomes of public goods provi-
sion are positively affected by the strength of incentives, for a given
amount of expenditures. The difference in infant mortality rates between
Table 4. New business formation as a function of government incentives.
# of created this year private de novo
and privatized firms
Dependent variable
(1)
Fixed effects
(2)
Random effects
(3)
OLS
Incentives proxy    1.71c
  (1.91)
   1.46c
  (1.83)
   1.31
  (1.54)
Population    0.007
  (0.25)
   0.001
  (1.29)
Log of expenditures per capita  –9.22a
(–4.41)
 –5.46a
(–4.09)
Constant    0.35
  (0.62)
# of cities    27    27    27
Sample size    112    112    112
R2 within    0.23    0.22
R2 between    0.22    0.27
R2 overall    0.11    0.15    0.02
Notes: Incentives proxy = 1 if annual changes in shared and own revenues have
the same sign, and = 0 otherwise. (1) and (2) include year dummies. T-statistics
in parentheses. a and c — denote significance at 1 and 10% levels respectively.
Hausman test for (2): χ2(2) = 7.04; Pr > χ2 = 0.07.
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the groups with better and worse fiscal incentives on average is equal to
about 9.9 deaths out of 10,000 born (which is equal to 5% of the aver-
age in the whole sample). The difference in percentages of school
Table 5. Efficiency of public goods provision is a function of government incen-
tives.
Infant mortality Unavailability of schools
Dependent
variable (1)
Fixed
effects
(2)
Random
effects
(3)
OLS
(4)
IV, Fixed
effects
(5)
Fixed
effects
(6)
Random
effects
(7)
OLS
(8)
IV, Fixed
effects
Incentives
proxy
 –0.97b
(–2.57)
 –0.99a
(–2.70)
 –1.35c
(–1.83)
 –0.99b
(–2.35)
 –1.60b
(–2.53)
 –1.71a
(–2.71)
–0.60
(–0.76)
 –1.48c
(–1.82)
Log of health
care expend.
per capita
   0.25
(–0.41)
   0.35
(–0.58)
   0.43
  (0.215)
Log of educa-
tion expend.
per capita
 –0.22
(–0.14)
 –0.06
  (0.05)
 –2.78a
(–3.78)
Population    0.01
  (0.85)
 –0.00
(–0.01)
   0.01
  (1.21)
 –0.02
(–0.79)
 –0.02
(–0.91)
Constant  19.25a
(34.5)
31.11a
(51.5)
# of cities    35    35  35    35    35    35 35    35
Sample size    138    138  139    135    139    139    135
R2 within    0.16    0.16    0.36    0.35
R2 between    0.00    0.06    0.00    0.01
R2 overall    0.01    0.05  0.03    0.05    0.02    0.13    0.10
Hausman test:
χ2(7)
   3.30    2.50
Hausman test:
Pr > χ2
   0.86    0.87
Notes: Unavailability of schools measured by percent of children who attend
school in the evening. Incentives proxy = 1 if annual changes in shared and own
revenues have the same sign, and = 0 otherwise. (1), (2), (5), and (6) include
year dummies. (4) and (8) use ratio of industrial to agricultural output in the re-
gion to instrument for log expenditures per capita in the city. T-statistics are in
parentheses. a, b, and c — denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% levels, respec-
tively.
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children who have to go to school in the evening between the two
groups on average is equal to 1.6 (5.3% of the average in the whole
sample). To produce robust results, I use instrumental variables as well
as fixed and random effects. The results are robust across specifica-
tions. The results of Table 5 support the view that with weaker fiscal in-
centives the local governments spend the money less efficiently.
Table 6 presents results of the estimation of equation (10) for two sub-
samples based on the value of the incentives proxy. The coefficient on
public expenditures is much higher and more significant for the sub-
sample with better fiscal incentives if we control for city differences by
using specification with random effects. The point estimate of coefficient
ρ of the logarithm of health care expenditures per capita in regression
(1) of Table 6, with infant mortality as independent variable and sub-
sample where incentives proxy is unity, is –2.50 with a t-statistic
of –1.85. The point estimate of the same parameter in the same regres-
sion on the sub-sample with zero incentives proxy is equal zero with
zero t-statistic. The results of analogous regressions of percentage of
children attending schools in the evening gives point estimate for ρ
of –8.98 (with –4.11 t-statistic) for better incentives sub-sample, and
–1.12 (with –0.68 t-statistic) for worse incentives sub-sample. This pro-
vides further evidence consistent with the view that with harder budget
constraints for local governments, spending is more efficient and,
therefore, the real impact of each ruble spent is higher.
To summarize, the results of Tables 3–6 are the following. First, fiscal
incentives of local politicians in Russia are very weak; indeed, on aver-
age, they are non-existent, since changes in own revenues are almost
entirely offset by changes in shared revenues. Second, the number of
businesses formed depends positively on the strength of fiscal incen-
tives. And third, the strength of fiscal incentives positively affects the ef-
ficiency of public spending.
6. ROBUSTNESS CHECK
In this section, I discuss the robustness of the results described above.
One may believe that wealthy cities experience increases in their reve-
nues, have efficient public goods provision and profitable growing en-
terprises, and so do not need subsidies. In contrast, poor cities have to
spend a lot on subsidies and experience both decline in revenues and
poor public goods provision. This story may be an alternative explana-
tion for the results presented in Tables 4, 5 and 6. In that case, the re-
sults would be driven by the presence of wealthy cities in the group with
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Table 6. Efficiency of expenditures is a function of government incentives:
separate estimations on sub-samples with better and worse fiscal incentives.
Infant mortality
(1)
Fixed effects
(2)
Random effects
(3)
OLS
Dependent variable
1 0 1 0 1 0
Log of health care exp.
per capita
 –2.50c
(–1.85)
   0.17
  (0.31)
 –4.00a
(–3.35)
   0.24
  (0.47)
 –5.29a
(–4.20)
 –0.69
(–0.52)
Log of education exp.
per capita
Population    0.03
  (1.17)
 –0.00
(–0.06)
 –0.00
  (0.65)
 –0.00
(–0.91)
Constant    46.8a
  (6.80)
   22.9a
  (3.65)
# of cities    31    31    31    31    31    31
Sample size    78    60    78    60    78    60
R2 within    0.12    0.00    0.09    0.00
R2 between    0.00    0.03    0.27    0.03
R2 overall    0.01    0.01    0.20    0.02    0.19    0.01
Hausman test: χ2(2)    5.50    0.13
Hausman test: Pr > χ2    0.07    0.94
Unavailability of schools
(4)
Fixed effects
(5)
Random effects
(6)
OLS
Dependent variable
1 0 1 0 1 0
Log of health care exp.
per capita
Log of education exp.
per capita
 –8.98a
(–4.11)
 –1.12
(–0.68)
 –6.56a
(–4.20)
 –0.14
(–0.11)
 –5.31a
(–3.36)
  1.31
 (0.83)
Population    0.01
  (0.38)
 –0.03
(–0.96)
   0.00
  (0.42)
 –0.01
(–0.66)
Constant    60.8a
  (6.74)
  23.8a
 (8.80)
# of cities    31    31    31    31    31   31
Sample size    79    60    79    60    79   60
R2 within    0.32    0.05    0.32    0.04
R2 between    0.04    0.01    0.05    0.01
R2 overall    0.04    0.01    0.13    0.01    0.13   0.01
Hausman test: χ2(2)    5.15    2.40
Hausman test: Pr > χ2    0.07    0.30
Notes: Unavailability of schools measured by percent of children who attend
school in the evening. 1 and 0 — Incentives proxy (1 — if annual changes in
shared and own revenues have the same sign, and 0 otherwise). T-statistics are
in parentheses. a and c — denote significance at 1 and 10% levels, respectively.
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good fiscal incentives. This is a serious concern because there are eight
times more observations with both shared and own revenues going up
(wealthy cities) than observations with both shared and own revenues
going down (poor cities) in the group with good fiscal incentives, so it
may be the case that on average the effect of wealthy cities dominates.
To test against this alternative interpretation of the results, I exclude the
wealthy cities from the sample and repeat the analysis presented above.
I split the sample into four groups: the first group, including 31 observa-
tions, for which shared revenues decreased and own revenues in-
creased; the second group contains 29 observations, for which shared
revenues increased and own revenues decreased; the third group con-
sists of 71 observations with changes in both shared and own revenues
are positive; and the fourth group includes observations for which
shared and own revenues declined. There are only 8 observations in
group 4.
According to the incentive story told in Section 3, groups 4 and 3 should
have better fiscal incentives then groups 1 and 2. This partition coin-
cides with the definition of the incentives proxy variable used for the
analysis above. Hypotheses II and III predict that observations in either
the third or the fourth group should have more favorable private busi-
ness environment and more efficient spending on public goods than ob-
servations in either group 1 or group 2. In particular, it should be true
for the fourth group. If that is the case, the alternative interpretation of
results in Tables 4, 5, and 6 can be rejected. The alternative interpreta-
tion says that only poor cities experience declines in revenues and inef-
ficient public goods provision.
Unfortunately, this robustness check of the results presented in Table 4
is statistically impossible due to small sample problem. This is because
there are only 5 observations in the fourth group for the variable meas-
uring new business formation.64 So, further, I concentrate on discussing
the robustness check of the results from testing hypothesis III only.
First, for a very crude robustness check, I plot infant mortality and per-
centage of children attending schools in the evening in Fig. 1. This
check is very crude because we do not control for any variables that in-
fluence measures of the quantity of public goods provision other then
the group itself.
As shown in Fig. 1 as expected the third group medians of both meas-
ures of public goods provision are below the medians of groups 1
and 2. The fourth group medians are the highest of all, however. This
may be due to a small sample problem (since there are only 8 observa-
tions in this group), or it can be related to the fact that in city-year
INCENTIVES TO PROVIDE LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS28
8
12
16
20
24
28
32
Group:          1                  2                   3                  4
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Figure 1. Infant mortality (a) and children, attending schools in the
evening (b) by group.
Definition of the groups (x axis):  # of obs.
group 1
group 2
group 3
group 4
— shared revenues decreased; own revenues increased;
— shared revenues increased; own revenues decreased;
— both shared and own revenues increased;
— both shared and own revenues decreased.
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Group:          1                  2                   3                  4
Median:      30.4              30.3              30.0              32.8
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combinations of group 4, cities have experienced an economic depres-
sion which both resulted in loss of revenues for the government and in a
general depression in the public sector. If this result reverses when
controlling for city-specific random effects, which presumably are cor-
related with negative economic shocks, then the alternative explanation
can still be rejected.
In Table 7, I present the results of a random effects regressions of real
measures of public goods provision on the logarithm of corresponding
public expenditures per capita for the sub-samples excluding group 3.
Table 7. Robustness check: sub-sample excluding observations with both
changes in shared and own revenues are positive.
Infant mortality Unavailability of schools
Dependent variable
(1)
Groups 1, 4
(2)
2, 4
(3)
1, 2, 4
(4)
1, 4
(5)
2, 4
(6)
1, 2, 4
Incentives proxy  –1.54b
(–2.20)
 –0.78
(–1.57)
 –1.25a
(–2.68)
 –2.36
(–1.54)
 0.48
(0.31)
 –1.32
(–1.00)
Log of health care
expend. per capita
   0.45
  (0.71)
   0.49
  (0.67)
   0.33
  (0.83)
Log of education
expend. per capita
 –0.04
(–0.02)
 0.25
(0.11)
 –0.61
(–0.46)
# of cities    25    26    31    25  26    31
Sample size    39    37    68    39  37    68
R2 within    0.32    0.26    0.18    0.29  0.01    0.06
R2 between    0.01    0.01    0.01    0.01  0.00    0.01
R2 overall    0.01    0.06    0.01    0.01  0.01    0.01
Hausman test: χ2(2)    0.95    0.00    0.31    2.89  0.30    1.45
Hausman test: Pr > χ2    0.62    1.00    0.85    0.24  0.85    0.48
Notes: Unavailability of schools measured by percent of children who attend
school in the evening. Incentives proxy = 1 if annual changes in shared and own
revenues have the same sign, and = 0 otherwise. Random effects specification
used. T-statistics are in parentheses. a and b — denote significance at 1 and 5%
levels, respectively. Definitions of groups: group 1 — shared ↓ and own ↑;
group 2 — shared ↑ and own ↓; group 3 — shared ↑ and own ↑; group 4 —
shared ↓ and own ↓.
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The results are not always significant because the sample size is very
small for these regressions; however, the results support the incentive
story. In 5 out of 6 regressions, the sign of the effect of the incentives
proxy is correct: higher incentives produce lower infant mortality (signifi-
cant at 5%) and a lower percentage of children studying in the evening
even when we exclude group 3. However, for school availability, the re-
sults are insignificant (the t-statistic is at most 1.54) and in one regres-
sion the sign is wrong but insignificant.
To summarize, the effect of the incentives proxy on infant mortality is
robust to the sample selection that excludes observations for which all
sources of revenues increased. The effect of incentives proxy on the
measure of school availability has the right sign for the comparison of
groups 1 and 4 and has a wrong sign for a comparison of groups 2 and
4 (both comparisons are insignificant). The right sign appears when
groups 1 and 2 are put together. Overall, the story of incentives passes
the robustness check.
One may think that the city status should not change over time and
most of the variation should come from the differences between cities.
However, fifteen out of 35 cities in my sample have switched between
better and worse incentives groups more than once. This may be re-
lated to the fact that over the period of 6 years (from 1992 to 1997)
there have been many political changes in the cities. For example, the
fact that mayors and governors have changed may explain why many
cities switched groups.
7. CONCLUSIONS
One of Russia’s major problems is its structure of inter-governmental
relations. The main finding of this paper is that Russian localities never
became financially independent from the regional governments. Local
officials have not been given sufficient responsibility for their decisions
on expenditures and have not been granted the right to raise their own
revenues. This paper provides some evidence that revenue sharing rela-
tions between local and regional governments hinder local government’s
incentives for providing infrastructure for private business development.
In addition, it shows that the fiscal dependence of local governments on
the regions has a negative effect on the efficiency of local public goods
provision.
The point this paper is making is that economic reform needs to be
supported by the reform of governmental institutions that would align
the interests of businessmen, citizens and government officials. This is
particularly vital at the local level.
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This paper sheds some light on the ongoing debate of why some coun-
tries undertaking economic reforms grow faster than others and why
Russia is in the slow growth group.
My conclusions also have implications for the theory of decentralization:
shifts in expenditures towards higher decentralization will not achieve
the expected benefits without a concurrent shift in control towards lo-
calities over how much revenue local governments can collect.
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NOTES
1 Source: Russian Economic Trends, 1998.
2 Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1995); Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer (1997).
3 For a survey of this literature, see Qian and Weingast (1997).
4 In 1994, in China another major fiscal reform was introduced.
5 Montinola et al. (1995) p. 64.
6 Wong (1997); Arora and Norregaard (1997).
7 The use of the term "fiscal federalism" here is somewhat unconventional, since
it refers to the fiscal incentives of governments resulting from the system of
revenue sharing between different levels of government.
8 For institutional background on Chinese government, see Oi (1992), Qian and
Xu (1993), Oi (1994), Montinola et al. (1995), Qian and Weingast (1996), Qian
and Weingast (1997), Wong (1997), and Arora and Norregaard (1997).
9 In both Russia and China prior to their fiscal reforms, local governments were
formally just branches of the upper tiers of government and were administratively
dependent on them.
10 The Chinese levels of government are the following: (1) central, (2) provincial,
(3) prefecture, (4) county or municipality, and (5) township or district.
11 Arora and Norregaard (1997).
12 The Russian levels of government are the following: (1) federal, (2) regional,
(3) the "first tier local", including cities and rayons, (4) the "second tier local",
including cities within rayons and districts within cities, and (5) the "third tier lo-
cal", including districts within cities within rayons.
13 The lowest two tiers are branches of the first tier local governments and are
directly subordinate to them. This paper studies only the first tier of local gov-
ernments in Russia and I will refer to them as local governments.
14 Russian fiscal reform started in 1991 and continues to this day.
15 Appendix A contains a detailed example of the distribution of expenditures and
revenues among the three levels of government in Russia in 1996.
16 See Table 2 on p. 24 in Arora and Norregaard (1997) for distribution of expen-
ditures between central and provincial governments and Table 1.8 on p. 56 in
Wong (1997) for distribution of expenditures between different tiers of sub-
national governments in China.
17 Wong (1997) p. 4, Federal law on the financial basis of local self government
#126–FZ–97, Budget code of Russian Federation #145–FZ–98.
18 Table 1 illustrates Russia’s composition of local public expenditures in selected
years. See Tables 4.7, 4.14, 4.17, 5.1, and 5.2 pp. 153–173 in Wong (1997) for
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Chinese composition of local public expenditures in selected counties and mu-
nicipalities in selected years.
19 The upper levels of government are responsible only for licensing for a number
of special kinds of activities that have large externalities, e.g. chemical manufac-
turing.
20 See Oi (1992) and Oi (1994) for details on China. For details on Russia see,
for instance, Federal law on licensing #158–FZ–98, President’s Decree on reg-
istration of subjects of entrepreneurial activity #1482–94, Federal Law on fire
safety #69–FZ–92, Federal Law on sanitary and epidemiological wellbeing of
population #5076–1–90, Government Resolutions on energy control #938–98,
communications control #1156–93, technical control #1291–93, and on trans-
port inspections #20–91, President’s Decree on control over enforcement of la-
bor legislation #850–94. These federal laws delegate regulatory authority to the
local level.
21 A comprehensive description of off-budget funds in Chinese localities is pro-
vided by Wong (1997) pp. 200–209. Several alternative definitions of off-budget
revenues are used in the literature. I stick to definition from Wong (1997).
22 For a detailed description of sources of off-budget revenues in China, see Ta-
ble 5.23 in Wong (1997) p. 202, and Table 1 for sources of own revenues in
Russia.
23 The relative importance of different sources of local revenues in Russia is de-
scribed in Table 1. The relative importance of different sources of township reve-
nues in China is given in Table 5.22 of Wong (1997) p. 200.
24 Wong (1997) p. 203.
25 Here I abstract from significant political differences in two the countries, for in-
stance, the dominance of the Communist party and the absence of elections at
the sub-national levels of government in China (except at the village-level which
is not a formal level of Chinese government) and consider only realized revenue
sharing contracts.
26 The description of revenue sharing in China given in this section applies to the
time of the fiscal reform of the early 1980’s up to 1994. A comprehensive study
of the Chinese revenue sharing arrangements at the sub-provincial level is given
in Wong (1997). For a description of revenue sharing between provinces and the
center see Jin et al. (1999).
27 At the township-level, off-budget revenues in China grew from 16.7% of total
revenues in 1986 to 26.3% in 1993 (see Table 5.22 p. 200 in Wong (1997)). At
the county-level, in late 1970s, off-budget revenues were below 10% of total
revenues; and in the early 1990s, they formed already approximately a half of
total revenues (see Montinola et al. (1995)). At the provincial level, extra-
budgetary funds (not including SRF) grew from 31.77% of total in 1980 to
46.17% in 1992 (see Table 5 p. 18 in Knight and Li (1999)).
28 See, for instance, Montinola et al. (1995) and Jin et al. (1999).
29 Table 1 p. 8 in Knight and Li (1999).
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30 Wong (1997), pp. 193–194. In one province, the remittance rate reached up to
87% for townships. Wong considers this case to be of line with other provinces,
however.
31 Wong (1997), p. 200.
32 Upper levels of government in China are often not given information about
SRF. Also only after 1988, upper levels started to monitor EBF.
33 See, for instance, Montinola et al. (1995) and Jin et al. (1999).
34 Treisman (1996a, 1996b, 1997).
35 Since revenues from shared taxes and transfers are perfect substitutes for
both regional and local governments, there is no conceptual difference between
shared taxes and transfers.
36 It is worth noting that in other aspects of political and economic reform, China
and Russia either taken similar measures, or China has moved more slowly. For
example, in such dimensions of reform as the speed of liberalization, the pres-
ence of a coherent reform program, the commitment to privatization and to
changes in the political system, Russia seems far more advanced. At the same
time, both countries still exhibit a lack of the rule of law and insecure private
property rights. See Parker, Tritt, and Woo (1997).
37 By regulation I mean registration, licensing and various inspections of firms.
Each of these activities is done by a special department of mayor’s office and fi-
nanced out of the local budget. I assume that budget cost of regulation is inde-
pendent of the level of regulation, it is mostly wages to inspectors.
38 One can treat 1–c as cost of effort to provide public goods. An alternative in-
terpretation of c is the mayor’s discount factor: the mayor values political benefits
because they are a mean of getting private benefits in the future.
39 This assumption is reasonable because otherwise we would not observe any
bribes in equilibrium.
40 For a discussion of these assumptions, see Johnson, Kaufmann, and Shleifer
(1997).
41 For the solution to be unique and determined by F.O.C., I assume, that
( ) ( )ByPg  is concave with respect to both variables, i.e. ( ) ygygyg ′′′′<′′ 2 ;
( ) 0<′′ Pg ; ( ) 0<′′ By .
42 The proof of propositions 1–4 is given in Appendix C.
43 Since less revenues are spent on perks and, therefore, more productive public
goods are provided using the same amount of budget revenues. By productive
public goods I mean public goods that positively influence city tax base.
44 In generalizations of the model that explicitly include tax rates, the result that
the mayor with weaker fiscal incentives regulates more than the mayor with
stronger fiscal incentives, still holds. However, the mayor with weak fiscal incen-
tives will have lower tax rates than the mayor with strong fiscal incentives since
with weak fiscal incentives the additional taxes do not result in additional budget
revenues. Therefore, the overall effect of the strength of fiscal incentives on the
local economy is ambiguous: Less of distortive taxation should make the tax base
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grow; more of distortive regulation should make it shrink. If we assume that
regulation is sufficiently more distortive than official taxation, than the tax base
would increase with fiscal incentives.
45 Goskomstat is the official Russian statistical agency.
46 There are about 3,000 first tier local governments of which 400 are cities.
There are about 100 cities comparable in size and political and economic weight
in the region to the cities in my sample. The choice of cities in my sample is not
random. It depended on the personal ties of the deputy director of the LRC, a
former mayor of Kaliningrad, with the mayors of the city-members of LRC. With-
out these personal ties, it would have been impossible to schedule interviews and
convince the city-administrations to fill in the questionnaires. However, I do not
have reasons to believe the choice of the cities would systematically affect the
findings, except for the fact that these are large city-donors.
47 Unlike in China, where the rural communities became the location of business
growth, rural communities in Russia were practically destroyed by collectivist ag-
riculture.
48 Russia’s GDP per capita in 1997 was $3,092 (PPP adjusted and corrected for
unofficial economy). Total public spending (federal, regional, and local, including
off-budget) constituted about 40% of GDP. Source: Russian Economic Trends,
1998.
49 See footnote 27 for information on size of own revenues in China.
50 Precise definitions of the variables are given in the methodology section.
51 Details on construction of these variables are given in Table 1.
52 This is particularly important because of the small sample size of 139 observa-
tions in first differences.
53 Correlation coefficient between tax base for shared taxes and local own reve-
nues is 0.58, significant at 1% level.
54 If both changes in shared revenues and in own revenues are positive, it could
reflect the fact that the regional government transferred some functions to the
local level with funds sufficient to cover only part of these expenditures. This ex-
ample shows that there could still be some crowding out even when changes in
shared and own revenues are both positive. Most of the mandatory transfers of
functions were ordered by federal (and not regional) legislation, however, and
should affect all cities at the same time. In that case, year dummies take care of
this mis-measurement problem.
55 There are three alternative measures of fiscal incentives that I have tried to
use. One is to take the residuals from the regression (1). Positive values of re-
siduals then indicate above average fiscal incentives and negative values of re-
siduals indicate below average fiscal incentives. This approach gives qualitative
results that are similar to the results reported in this paper. Statistically, however,
these results are rarely significant. This is probably because continuous variable
that would measure the strength of financial incentives suffers from the problem
of unobserved mandatory expenditures just as the binary measure but the con-
tinuous variable is noisier. Another approach is to estimate fiscal incentives for
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each city using time series data. This approach yields similar qualitative results to
ones reported in the paper, however, the results are statistically insignificant due
to a small sample problem in time series component of the data. The third ap-
proach is to use binomial indicator of fiscal incentives just as in the paper but
other cutoff points in splitting the sample in two groups with better and worse fis-
cal incentives. I have tried several reasonable cutoff points and they yield practi-
cally the same results as the ones reported in the paper.
56 This variable is not adjusted to exclude from consideration those new busi-
nesses that arise from the splitting-up of existing firms.
57 Corporate income tax law of Russian Federation. The law was adopted on
12.27.91. Tax holidays remained in the law up until 1998.
58 For instance, it may be the case that infant mortality is low in the richer cities
because of better nutrition and, in these cities, public expenditures are also large
because of high tax revenues. In this case, a consistent and unbiased estimate of
the effect of the incentives proxy on measures of public goods provision, given
the level of expenditures, can be obtained by using instrumental variables. I also
present a robustness check in Section 6 that controls for this possible endoge-
neity problem. It repeats the analysis on a sub-sample that excludes richer cities.
59 Shares of industrial and agricultural production in total output are argued to be
a legacy of the soviet planning system and, therefore, can be viewed as exoge-
nous.
60 The incentives variable is highly correlated with the interaction term: the cor-
relation coefficient is 0.9999. So, the effect of interaction term on outcomes of
public goods provision is statistically indistinguishable from the effect of the in-
centives proxy.
61 There is no intercept in the regressions of Table 3. The main result is inde-
pendent of whether the sum of city effects is constrained to zero or not. Both
approaches lead to the same coefficient of the change in own revenues up to a
third decimal with almost the same significance level. This is because the sum of
the city effects (when unconstrained) is not significantly different from zero.
62 The results of Table 3 could be generated if there just is a certain total amount
of taxes that can be collected from each territory, in other words, if for some ex-
ogenous reason tax bases for shared and own taxes are almost perfectly nega-
tively correlated. The tax bases for shared and own taxes, however, are positively
correlated both in across cities and over time. Correlation coefficient is 0.58, sig-
nificant at 1% level.
63 See Wong (1997) p. 194.
64 Unlike other variables, the new business formation variable can be constructed
only for capital-cities of their regions. However, if we ignore the small sample
problem and compare the medians of the four groups (they are 0.09, –0.18,
2.08, and –1.19, respectively), we would conclude that the robustness check is
failed. However, this is a very weak conclusion since it is based only on 5 obser-
vations.
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APPENDICES
A. Revenues, expenditures and intergovernmental transfers of
different levels of government in Russia in 1996
R trillion
Distribution between
the levels of consolidated
budget
Federal Regional Local Federal Regional Local
Tax revenues   218.7   120.1   134.1 46.2%   25.4%   28.4%
Total revenues   281.6   138.0   148.2 49.6%   24.3%   26.1%
Expenditures net of
transfer
  271.6   147.3   187.5 44.8%   24.3%   30.9%
Surplus before transfer,
R trillion
and % of expenditures
net of transfer
  9.9 –9.3 –39.3 3.7% –6.3% –20.9%
Deficit financing
(net surplus)
–29.0 –9.7   0.0 75.0%   25.0%   0.0%
Net transfer, R trillion
and % of tax revenues
  38.9   0.4 –39.3 17.8%   0.3% –29.3%
Notes: Expenditures net of transfers = total revenues – transfer – deficit financ-
ing. 1997 average dollar exchange rate is 5,600 rubles per dollar. Source: Minis-
try of Finance of Russian Federation.
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B. Descriptive statistics
Variable Units # obs Median Mean Std. Err Min Max
Population #, 1,000 139 486 601.9 36.8   12 1430
Total
expenditures
R, mm 139 599,863.0 886,981.5 65,227.2   10,519 3,087,459
Own revenues R, mm 139 77,441.2 148,972.7 15,960.8   277 1,007,639
Shared revenues R, mm 139 540,121.1 746,242.8 53,203.7   10,195 2,714,642
Annual change
in own revenues
R, mm 139 12,486.5 35,678.9 10,521.4 –599,073 652,332
Annual change in
shared revenues
R, mm 139 35,221.6 63,532.9 19,118.0 –805,040 884,602
Annual change
in expenditures
R, mm 139 57,380.8 115,321.9 18,955.8 –475,644 811,551
Incentives proxy #,
binomial
139 1 0.56 0.08   0 1
Education
spending
per capita
R, 1,000 139 269.8 301.7 8.6   63.8 582.9
Health care
spending
per capita
R, 1,000 138 221.3 231.7 7.0   28.9 444.3
Infant mortality 1/1,000 139 18.0 18.5 0.4   9.9 28.2
Kids, attending
schools
in the evening
% 139 30.0 30.8 0.4   22 41.3
New business
formation
(regional)
#, 1,000 112 1.03 0.21 0.42 –11.6 13.4
Number of busi-
nesses (regional)
#, 1,000 144 7.53 9.49 0.68   1.6 32.2
Notes: 1997 average dollar exchange rate is 5,600 rubles per dollar. All nominal
variables in constant prices of 1997. Incentives proxy = 1 in 79 observations
and = 0 in 60 observations.
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C. The proof of propositions 1–4
SBPc
SBP
++
,,
max   ..ts   ( ) ( ) ( )ByPgTSP α++≤+ 1
Assumptions:
A1. ( ) ( )ByPg  — concave ... trw  P and B, i.e. ( ) ygygyg ′′′′<′′ 2 ;
( ) 0<′′ Pg ; ( ) 0<′′ By .
A2. ( ) ( ) .0;0 <′>′ ByPg
A3. 10 << c ; 01 ≤α≤− .
A4. 0;0;0 ≥≥≥ SBP .
Denote the lagrange multiplier of (*) by λ .
F.O.C. for (*):
If 1>λ , then
0=S (i)
( ) ( ) ( )ByPgTP α++= 1 (ii)
( ) ( ) ( ) 01 =′α+λ+λ− ByPgc  (iii)
( ) ( ) ( ) 011 =′α+λ+ ByPg (iv)
If 1=λ , then
0>S (v)
( ) ( ) ( )ByPgTPS α++=+ 1 (vi)
( ) ( ) ( ) 011 =′α++− ByPgc (vii)
( ) ( ) ( ) 011 =′α+λ+ ByPg (viii)
(i)–(viii) define B*, S*, P*.
Proposition 1. α∀ : 0
*
<
αd
dB
.
Proof of proposition 1:
(vii), (viii) ⇒  
( )
0
1
22
2
*
<




′′
′′
−′′α+




−
′′
′
′
=
α
yg
yg
yg
g
g
g
y
d
dB
.
INCENTIVES TO PROVIDE LOCAL PUBLIC GOODS40
Proposition 2. α∀ : 0
*
>
αd
dP
.
Proof of proposition 2:
(vi), (viii) ⇒  0
))(()1(
)(
2
2*
>
′′−′′′′α+
′′−′′
−=
α ygygyg
yygg
d
dP
.
Proposition 3. [ ] ( ) 0**
*
1
<
α



α+−=+ ygdWTd
d
dS
.
Proof of proposition 3: By assumption ** PS +  is constant and by
proposition 2, *P is increasing in ϕ, therefore *S must be decreasing
in ϕ.
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